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Speaking Habermas to Gramsci: implications for the vocational 
preparation of community educators  
 
John Bamber and Jim Crowther 
 
Abstract 
 
Re-working the Gramscian idea of the ‘organic’ intellectual from the cultural-
political sphere to Higher Education (HE), suggests the need to develop critical 
and questioning ‘counter hegemonic’ ideas and behaviour in community 
education students. Connecting this reworking to the Habermasian theory of 
communicative action, suggests that these students also need to learn how to be 
constructive in developing such knowledge. Working towards critical and 
constructive capacities is particularly relevant for students who learn through 
acting in practice settings where general principles and purposes acquired in the 
academy need to be interpreted in response to the unique demands of specific 
situations. From a Gramscian perspective, enabling students to develop the 
qualities of organic intellectuals means that lecturers have a duty to teach critical 
knowledges which the student will be unfamiliar with and unlikely to possess. If 
teaching is not to become simply didactic, however, there is also a need to 
acknowledge Habermas’s contention that all knowledge is contingent. This does 
not mean that knowledge is merely relative, subjective, or essentially interest 
serving, as some postmodernists would have it. In Habermasian terms, 
knowledge is developed through a rigorous process of contesting validity claims 
according to procedures appropriate to discipline areas. In these procedures, 
contestation occurs to the point where there is general agreement about the best 
current understanding, until such time as this is overtaken by ideas with a better 
claim. The danger is that over commitment to contestation in the classroom 
undermines subject knowledge and ultimately the authority of the educator. 
Speaking Habermas to Gramsci, and vice versa, helps socially and politically 
committed educators to construct a space in which didactic and discursive 
moments purposefully alternate.  
 
Opening caveat 
Our focus on learning from the complementary interests of Habermas and 
Gramsci begins by acknowledging that, in many respects, these two people 
would have little to speak to each other about. In one corner, Habermas, the 
grand German intellectual and leading thinker of the Frankfurt School of critical 
theory developed a framework for societal critique which replaces the working 
class as an agent of progressive change; his ideas on communicative 
competence seem to be firmly located within a social democratic politics rather 
than a revolutionary one. In the other corner, the Sardinian hunchback Gramsci 
was a revolutionary Marxist and intellectual leader of the working class 
movement in Italy in the 1920s. The main focus of his life work is to explain the 
failure of the working class to make revolutionary change in the west and to 
advance this cause in the future by developing new forms of political strategy. 
His university was fashioned from the prison cell and his incarceration there was, 
as Mussolini remarked, to stop him thinking. So initially they seem unlikely 
intellectual resources to consider what they could, in fact, speak about if the 
circumstances had been different.  
 
In one respect, however, they have a great deal in common in that Habermas’ 
ideas on communicative competence can be interpreted through the frame of 
education and the need to provide deliberative opportunities for arriving at 
reasoned courses of action (Welton 1995). For Gramsci too, education was an 
essential component for challenging the dominant hegemony of society in order 
to create a new and more progressive culture based on the aspirations and 
values of an exploited working class. Indeed, some of his political 
contemporaries were critical of what they saw as an excessive ‘culturalism’ in his 
analysis and politics (Davidson 1974).  In the context of this common ground the 
task of speaking Habermas to Gramsci may not be as absurd as it at first may 
seem.  
 
The academy today 
 
Higher education today is facing difficult times not only in justifying public funding 
but also more fundamentally in relation to purpose. Whilst the University has, at 
its best, been a place for the generation and transmission of scientific, technical, 
and critical knowledge, and the ‘best that has been thought and said’ (as 
expressed by Matthew Arnold), there are distinct pressures today which seriously 
limit these broad institutional aims and even threaten to diminish them. Issues of 
concern include the dominance of technical rationality and the increasingly 
stifling effects of new pubic management, the construction of higher education as 
a competitive market place, the commodification of knowledge and research, and 
the vacuity of much fashionable postmodern theorising. Not least is the 
ubiquitous ‘common sense’ of individualised models and modes of learning and 
achievement. All of these issues, and more, deserve full attention but we confine 
ourselves here to the issue of mode of learning, concentrating in particular on 
how this is shaped by the educative relationship between lecturers and students 
in HE and the context in which community educators practice.   
 
The lecturer-student relationship presents particular challenges for committed 
educators who seek to develop the knowledge and skills of students to work in 
socially purposeful ways in communities. This challenge can be usefully explored 
in the specific case of degree level, professional training courses in community 
education. In this kind of training students need to develop the knowledge and 
skills to work with people in communities in ways that strengthen democratic 
capacities and processes. The following quote is from the Scottish Executive’s 
(2004: 1) guidance on community learning and development - the term used in 
Scotland for the practice of community education in the public sector: 
 
Community learning and development is a way of listening and of 
working with people. We define this as informal learning and 
social development work with individuals and groups in their 
communities. The aim of this work is to strengthen communities 
by improving people’s knowledge, skills and confidence, 
organisational ability and resources. Community learning and 
development makes an important contribution towards promoting 
lifelong learning, social inclusion and active citizenship. 
 
Inherent in this work is the need to support people in voicing issues of concern, 
and in participating in policy and decision-making structures regardless of factors 
such as age, race, class or sex. In broad terms this may be described as 
supporting a social democratic tradition that emphasises the active involvement 
of citizens in decision-making in their social, economic and cultural life.  Tett 
(2002: 96) describes this as:  
 
…promoting their free and equal participation, in both defining the 
problems to be addressed and the solutions to be used, in ways 
that mitigate economic and social inequalities. It requires a public 
space in which different groups can come together to air their 
differences and build solidarity around common interests. 
 
Both Habermas and Gramsci offer significant theoretical resources for 
developing the kind of educative practice required in community education 
degree level courses. Taken together, however, their contribution is greater as 
both complement the other in particular respects. With reference to our own work 
at the University of Edinburgh, we will argue that relating key concepts from 
Habermas and Gramsci can help committed academics simultaneously to 
enhance didactic and discursive forms of educative practice.  
 
Habermas and teaching community education 
 
Although the implications of Habermas’s work for education are not explicit 
(Englund, 2006: 504); his work can be usefully applied to professional training in 
community education. This is because teaching and learning processes rest on 
presuppositions about the nature of reason and knowledge construction, both of 
which are of central concern to Habermas. He asks the question of how reliable 
knowledge is possible and answers that knowledge is only possible when 
science assumes its proper place as just one of the accomplishments of reason. 
In this larger concept of reason, knowledge is defined both by the objects of 
experience and by a priori categories and concepts that the knowing subject 
brings to every act of thought and perception. This means that ideas do not 
simply derive from experience but are constituents of it. Indeed, ‘the validity of 
scientific knowledge, of hermeneutic understanding, and of mundane knowledge 
always depends as much on its “subjective”, and inter-subjective, constituents as 
it does on any methodologically verifiable observation and experience of the 
object-world’ (Pusey, 1987: 22). For Habermas the power of reason is grounded 
in the process of reflection:  ‘In other words, the terms that we bring from within 
ourselves to the process of inquiry - in any and every domain, including science - 
are amenable to a reflection that is rational for the very reason that it carries the 
potential for a more inclusive conceptualisation that is better tuned to the 
common interest of the human condition’ (1973: 161).  
 
Habermas’s account of reflection and reasoning speaks directly to what is 
required in a vocational degree like community education where theory is meant 
to underpin activity and where, crucially, the results of activity are meant to feed 
back into the theorising process. The premise is that no one theory fits every 
given eventuality and practitioners have to interpret the possibilities suggested in 
broad concepts and frameworks in new and unpredictable situations. As Barnet 
(2004: 259) has argued, this means that students now require the personal 
resources to be willing and able to deal with uncertainty in a ‘super-complex’ 
world: ‘Learning for an unknown future cannot be accomplished by the 
acquisition of either knowledge or skills. There is always an epistemological gap 
between what is known and the exigencies of the moment as it invites 
responses, and this is particularly so in a changing world.’ Habermas’s ideas 
about communicative rationality can inform thinking about the practice knowledge 
needed by students in dealing with uncertain situations. For Habermas, 
rationality ‘proper’ is the ability to let action be guided by a common 
understanding of reality; the consensus established through linguistic dialogue 
(Eriksen and Weigard, 2004: 4).  
 
Towards a discursive pedagogy 
It cannot be assumed that the capacity for communicative rationality is automatic 
in higher education. It requires educators, in the first instance, to shape the 
learning environment in particular ways. These include individual activities such 
as writing essays, through to collective experiences in lectures or group tasks. In 
the context of our own work, communicative rationality can be enhanced by 
attempts to implement what may be termed a ‘discursive pedagogy’. This 
concept posits an idealised state where learning and teaching environments are 
suffused with a generalised commitment to communicative rationality. For 
Habermas, discourse denotes a process of argumentation in which the rules 
implicit in ordinary speech are formalised. It is not to be associated with any one 
teaching approach such as a discussion or debate. Instead, in a discursive 
pedagogy attempts to approximate the ideal of discourse would pervade every 
aspect of the curriculum. Such attempts can be guided by four ‘ordering’ 
principles taken from the theory of communicative action (Bamber, 2007).  These 
are: 
 
• Learning depends upon acts of reciprocity 
• Knowledge can be developed through redeeming validity claims 
• It is necessary to safeguard rationality in processes of 
argumentation 
• In essence, becoming critically competent can be understood as a 
constructive achievement. 
 
The principle of learning through reciprocity derives from Habermas’s view that 
action oriented toward reaching understanding is the fundamental type of social 
action. When people speak to one another in everyday processes of 
communication they are involved in a reciprocal process of making claims about, 
for example, proper conduct in social relations. Because speakers can be called 
upon to justify their claims, ‘the burden of justification and the possibility of 
critique are built into the very structure of language and communication’ (Fultner, 
in Habermas, 2003c: xv). With respect to teaching and learning in the featured 
programme, the point to note here is the connection between reciprocal acts of 
justification and the development of knowledge. As Pusey (1987: 23) states: 
 
The distinctive feature of Habermas’s work is that processes of 
knowing and understanding are grounded, not in philosophically 
dubious notions of a transcendental ego, but rather in the patterns 
of ordinary language usage that we share in everyday 
communicative interaction.  
 
‘Processes of knowing and understanding’ can be taken as a proxy for learning. 
Seen in this way, the objectifying perspective provides a significant alternative to 
the idea that learning takes place only in the minds of individual students. It is a 
commonplace, of course, that learning is affected by environmental factors such 
as the way that teachers present materials or the influence of the peer group. 
These and other factors may be seen primarily, however, in terms of the way that 
they assist or hinder the individual learning that is considered to take place in the 
mind. In contrast, the concept of learning through reciprocity points to the 
educational potential of interactive and inter-subjective communicative 
processes. 
 
The second principle emphasises the educational potential in reciprocity by 
foregrounding the idea that knowledge is constructed through ‘redeeming’ claims. 
This is because in communicative action one person tries rationally to motivate 
another to act or think in certain ways based on the implicit understanding that 
the speaker will, if necessary, produce reasons to back up their claims 
(Habermas, 2003b: 59). Interpreting Habermas’s theory in simple terms, the 
claims deal with: 
 
• the empirical world of objective reality 
• the social world of shared norms and values 
• the inner world of subjective attitudes.  
 
Speech acts can be ‘redeemed’, i.e. accepted, or rejected in relation to each of 
these three worlds. All three claims are raised simultaneously although one might 
be explicit with the other two remaining implicit. This is highly significant in terms 
of the development of knowledge because the process of redeeming claims 
through contestation eventually leads to a provisional understanding of what is 
considered to be valid. Over time, according to Habermas (2003b: 170), this 
process of validating empirical, social and subjective claims results in the 
development of knowledge in relation to four types of action: teleological, 
normative, dramaturgical and constative.   
 
Teleological action embodies technically and strategically usable knowledge 
through rules of action. This kind of action can be improved through feedback 
about effectiveness. Normatively regulated action embodies moral-practical 
knowledge and like claims to truth. This would apply to actions undertaken in 
specific situations with moral and practical elements, for instance, being able to 
evaluate professional interventions and modify practice in the light of the findings. 
Dramaturgical action embodies knowledge of the actor’s own subjectivity. This 
would apply to actions requiring self-awareness and emotional intelligence, such 
as being able to adopt a critical approach to one’s own professional performance. 
Constative speech acts embody knowledge and explicitly represent it in order to 
make conversations possible. This would apply to the capacity to engage in 
discussion involving, for example, conceptual exploration of meanings. 
 
A consequence of committing to learning through reciprocity and developing 
knowledge through redeeming claims is that all participants in discourse would 
share the same rights to contribute and have the same burden in terms of 
validating claims. In reality, however, this ideal is almost always prejudiced in 
terms of favouring opportunities according to privileged positions based on power 
differentials. In response to this danger, Habermas’s (2003c: 97-98) posited an 
‘ideal speech situation’ in which: 
 
…communication is impeded neither by external contingent 
forces, or, more importantly, by constraints arising from the 
structure of communication itself. The ideal speech situation 
excludes systematic distortion of communication.  Only then is the 
sole prevailing force the characteristic unforced force of the better 
argument, which allows assertions to be methodically verified in 
an expert manner and decisions about practical issues to be 
rationally motivated.   
 
Some basic presuppositions or ‘rules’ in argumentation can be elaborated as 
follows (Habermas, 2003a: 89): 
 
• Every subject with a competence to speak and act is allowed to 
take part in a discourse 
• Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever 
• Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the 
discourse 
• Everyone is allowed to express his or her attitudes, aspirations, 
and needs 
• No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, 
from exercising the rights laid down above. 
 
For Habermas, these rules are not mere conventions but inescapable 
presuppositions, and participants in argumentation must assume these 
conditions to be approximately realised. This understanding foregrounds the 
importance of the third principle: the need to safeguard participation and protect 
rationality. The key educational point, as Brookfield (2005) has argued at length, 
is that abiding by the ‘rules’ of argumentation helps students to develop their own 
ideas and understanding in the process of becoming critically competent. In turn, 
this point signals the fourth principle that becoming competent is a constructive 
achievement.   
 
In Habermasian (2003a: 33-34) terms, competence can be understood as the 
capacity to produce knowledge leading to the resolution of empirical-analytic and 
moral-practical problems. The problem solving is measured objectively in terms 
of the truth claims of descriptive statements, including explanations and 
predictions, and in terms of the rightness of normative statements. Significantly 
for a vocationally oriented programme such as the degree in Community 
Education, it is also measured in terms of the justifications of actions and the 
norms governing them. Competence is developed as participants refine and 
develop ideas, behaviours and skills, through contesting what is or should be the 
case, and what they should or should not do in any given situation. Over time, 
according to this perspective, learners construct ever more dependable, in the 
sense of justifiable and tested, normative structures to underpin their work. In this 
notion of competence development, theory and practice are conditions for each 
other in that theory informs activity and the results of activity feed back into the 
theorising process. Practice knowledge is further developed through reflection as 
the concept is applied and reapplied as the situation develops. To the extent that 
they actively engage in processes of argumentation and reflection, students are 
constructing the kind of practice knowledge that is appropriate to the field of 
community education. 
 
Habermas’s (2003a: 33-34; 2003b: 170) ideas about teleological, normative, 
dramaturgical and constative action can be usefully reworked to classify four 
types of practice knowledge required by community educators:  
 
Technical or strategic (teleological) 
Knowledge involved, for example, in organising a structured, 
formal or informal learning experience in a youth club or adult 
education class, or setting up a community planning process. 
 
Moral-Practical (normative) 
Knowledge concerning the underpinning values and principles that 
enable practitioners to act appropriately in relation to professional 
standards and given norms.  It is necessary, for instance, to be 
able to distinguish between personal and professional belief 
systems. 
 
Personal (dramaturgical) 
Knowledge enabling insight into a practitioner’s own subjectivity 
and behaviour such as the ability to analyse the effects of one’s 
interventions on others. 
 
Theoretical (constative) 
Knowledge that is impersonal, abstract and expressed in general 
terms, which enables practitioners to clarify and justify activity. For 
instance, arguing a principled case for or against policy initiatives, 
debating meanings and contesting understandings of purpose in 
this field. 
 
The limits of reciprocity in the classroom 
It can be seen from the discussion so far that Habermas’s theory of 
communication has relevance to higher education in terms of the intersubjective 
nature of teaching and learning in the classroom. It also opens up a space in 
which learners are contributors to the development of knowledge through 
inescapable processes of contestation. The implication is that such processes 
need to be encouraged and promoted in classroom settings, and not only 
between students but also between students and teachers. In this case, 
however, it is probably safe to start from the assumption that as a general rule 
lecturers are deemed to be authorities. The tendency is not to challenge this 
position, at least openly. Failing to open up status to questioning, however, may 
involve lecturers in a ‘performative contradiction’ (Habermas, 2003a: 81). This 
condition occurs when someone says something contrary to a necessary or 
irreducible reality. For example, someone can say ‘I don't exist’ but this statement 
itself contains the assumption of existence. According to Habermas (2003c: 98) 
there are no constraints in communication when there is a symmetrical 
distribution of the opportunities for all possible participants to choose and perform 
speech acts, and adherence to the principle of learning as an act of reciprocity, 
would presuppose such a distribution of opportunities. In such a situation 
dialogue roles are universally interchangeable and there is an equality of 
opportunity to take on these roles.  
 
Power is always present in any situation in more or less obvious ways, however, 
and its influence inevitably plays out in relationships between groups and 
between individuals. Tisdell (2001) alerts us to differences in power in the 
classroom based on social factors such as race or gender, and status based on 
position. In principle, adherence to a discursive pedagogy would confront such 
differentials by, for example, subjecting the existence of competitive relationships 
between students and hierarchical relationships between lecturers and students 
to rational scrutiny. Nevertheless, even in situations where there is a deliberate 
attempt to approximate the conditions of the ideal speech situation the steering 
effects of power are operating. Lecturers need to make this knowledge available 
as a resource to community education students who are learning about power 
relations even as they are engaged in attempts to support people in communities 
to disrupt power in pursuit of social justice. This is not merely an abstract and 
theoretical discussion since it also calls for a recognition of the ways in which 
people may reproduce oppressive tendencies in their own behaviour. In this case 
it is important for lecturers to model critical thinking and open forms of 
communication in the classroom setting. 
 
Moreover, in a profession where students are preparing for educational 
engagement with disadvantaged communities there are political and practice 
choices to be made so that the educator is aware that they can be ‘part of the 
problem’ for communities, in other words reinforcing patterns of discrimination 
and oppression, or ‘part of the solution’ in terms of developing education for 
autonomy and liberation. Establishing truth through contestation might suggest a 
neutral stance in relation to such choices. This presents difficulties for politically 
committed educators for whom such choices are not open to question in any 
fundamental sense, and who, in any case, have a duty to transmit core concepts 
that form the bedrock of a discipline area. It is in regard to this question of 
commitment that the thought of Antonio Gramsci can provide helpful guidance to 
lecturers regarding their own work as educators, and to students in their role as 
learners.  
 
Gramsci: hegemony and the role of organic intellectuals 
Whilst the Marxist theoretician and leader of the Italian Communist Party, Antonio 
Gramsci, was concerned with wider issues of social change during the first third 
of the 20th century, his ideas on the role of education in this process have a 
bearing on how we might respond to the dilemmas posed for the academy today. 
One of the fundamental tasks Gramsci set himself, on being imprisoned from 
1926 to just before his death in 1937, was to explain why revolutions failed in the 
West but succeeded in Russia. This development seemed to run counter to 
Marxist ideas that socialism would be born in the womb of capitalism and its 
internal contradictions would be resolved by socialised means of production. His 
answer to this question was to identify the role of hegemony as the main arena of 
struggle, which was weak in feudal pre-revolutionary Russia but markedly 
stronger in advanced capitalist economies in the West. The site of struggle for 
revolutionary change moved away from the organisation of the relations of 
production to civil society where hegemony is made and, potentially, unmade.  
 
Whilst Gramsci was never precise in his definition of civil society, its relationship 
with the state in his work is unique. He makes the distinction between two 
aspects of the superstructure of society (in contrast to the economic base) in 
terms of civil society and the state/political society. These correspond to the 
exercise of two forms of power which reinforce class domination: hegemonic 
power (the directive ideas and values in society) and the state’s monopoly on 
legitimate coercive power. Civil society is made up of so-called private 
organisations like churches, trades unions and voluntary bodies which are 
characterised by social relations based on autonomy and free association 
whereas the state is defined primarily in relation to its coercive potential 
exercised through the activities of the army, judiciary and courts. Gramsci was 
aware, of course, that the state was not merely coercive. More importantly, the 
boundaries between civil society and state are permeable, and organisations and 
practices can embody social relations belonging to both spheres. The 
connections between state and civil society in reproducing class rule are 
reflected in Gramsci’s expanded view of the state as ‘political society + civil 
society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’ (1971 p. 
263). 
 
Civil society’s apparent distance from the state means it can be a powerful 
medium for the diffusion of the dominant hegemony. Education, for example, is 
provided in many countries by the state and influenced by its policies and 
economic priorities but Gramsci locates education firmly in civil society. 
Education is an important means of social reproduction but for Gramsci, it is also 
a key resource for developing the knowledge, skills and attitudes which are the 
foundation for the intellectual work that is fundamental to creating a new social 
order. The contexts where adults learn, such as higher education, are voluntarily 
chosen to some extent and provide spaces for legitimate critical engagement. 
They are, therefore, important sites for challenging hegemony because education 
is potentially the Achilles heel of social control.  
 
Gramsci’s analysis is also well known for identifying the role of intellectuals in the 
struggle for revolutionary change. His definition of ‘intellectual’ stresses function 
rather than cerebral capacity and his distinction between traditional intellectuals 
and organic intellectuals differentiates the two on this basis. Traditional 
intellectuals apply systematic bodies of knowledge across a range of social, 
educational, scientific and technical spheres without necessarily serving a clear 
hegemonic role – they may not be entirely ‘free floating’, in the sense of 
detachment from serving particular interests, but this function is not primary. It 
may occur incidentally or implicitly. Organic intellectuals, on the other hand, are 
more overtly directive in the sense that they articulate, disseminate and make 
explicit the culture, values and priorities of dominant or alternative social 
formations.  
 
Although the apparently directive function of organic intellectuals seems to 
suggest an elite role of a set of leaders above the people, in Gramsci’s analysis 
this function is expressed in terms of an ongoing dialectic. Intellectuals and 
people learn from each other while bringing qualitatively different kinds of 
experience to this relationship. Two points need noting. First, hegemony is an 
affective process that saturates experience as well as a cognitive process. 
Second, thought and feeling have to be systematically linked and related to each 
other. Understanding the interests of the people is not simply a process of 
handing down intellectual conclusions for people to ‘rubber stamp’, but instead 
involves an iterative process of identifying interests, explaining them, connecting 
them with experience, amending and developing them – in short an educative 
process between people and intellectuals which influences both.  
 
The education of ‘common sense’ 
For Gramsci every social group has its ‘common sense’ and education has a key 
role in turning it into ‘good sense’. Common sense is shaped by the dominant 
hegemony although its sources and composition amongst different social groups 
may involve accretions from a myriad of different influences. Nevertheless, it 
functions to reinforce the social position of subordinate groups. In making the 
distinction between common sense and good sense education has a critical role 
in interrogating the flaws, half-truths, contradictions and incoherence of everyday 
thinking that limits the capacity for informed and systematic social action towards 
liberation. In exploring this argument in Gramsci’s work, Entwistle’s (1979) 
account of ‘Conservative schooling for radical politics’ is helpful. 
 
The publication of Entwistle’s book was followed by a barrage of criticism by a 
number of influential critical pedagogues such as Henry Giroux, Douglas Holly 
and Quintin Hoare (1980).  They were reacting to the apparent claim that 
Gramsci held views on schooling that seemed closer to the Black Papers on 
education, which had emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in the UK, from leading 
Conservative ideologues on the theme of ’back to basics’ in education. Entwistle 
also argued that Gramsci was dismissive of so-called progressive active learning, 
in his own era, which was supported by the Italian Fascist government in the late 
1920s. Similarly, Entwistle drew attention to the varied references in Gramsci’s 
thinking on the value of hard work, discipline, routine and even repetition as 
constitutive of character. Moreover, he concluded that for Gramsci the school 
was not a potential site for critical pedagogy whereas adult education was the 
appropriate place for political education.  
 
There is no need to revisit the above debate but the hostile reception to 
Entwistle’s book might also have led to a case of ‘throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater’. His main argument focused on Gramsci’s commitment to the 
development of a broad and open education. Arguably, in terms of schooling at 
least the most relevant example of Gramsci’s position is Don Milani’s (see Borg 
et al 2009) school of Barbiana in Tuscany – made internationally famous in the 
1960s by the publication of Letter to a Teacher – which explicitly drew on 
Gramsci’s work.1 
                                                          
1 Our attention was drawn to this by Mario Cardona who is undertaking a PhD at the 
University of Edinburgh. 
 
A persistent theme in Gramsci’s writings is the need to learn from one’s enemies, 
particularly when these enemies are dominant. Belittling their achievement, whilst 
being dominated by them, is not a good starting point for developing a strong and 
convincing hegemonic position. The commitment to an open and broad 
curriculum, to assimilate what has gone before and to critically evaluate it, 
requires an approach to knowledge which is not ideologically blinkered even if it 
derives from a principled and partisan politics. These two extremes may seem 
contradictory but they result from the necessity of developing an educationally 
robust hegemony that is fashioned from a subordinate social and cultural base.  
 
As Entwistle points out, Gramsci makes an epistemological distinction between 
common sense and good sense which has pedagogical implications. Arriving at 
good sense requires sustained argument, rational deliberation, weighing of 
evidence, testing assumptions, discussion and so on in order to develop critical 
arguments that are convincing and capable of sustaining social change efforts. In 
the formation of organic intellectuals of the working class, where the habits of 
study were not developed, this created an immense and steep challenge. 
Moreover, it also has important implications for the role of the educator in that 
they have a key responsibility to use their authority as an educator – by 
introducing new knowledge, posing questions, challenging arguments and so on 
- with access to bodies of knowledge that students do not possess and 
pedagogical skills that guide the discussion. This does not protect bodies of 
knowledge from critical interrogation nor does it privilege a particular 
methodological approach. It is the educator’s performance of this role which 
makes the process distinctly educational and the demands and expectations on 
students that make it a distinctly higher education in terms of depth of 
knowledge, coherence and so on. But this is a very difficult trick to pull off, and 
requires attention to the communicative processes at play if the meeting between 
intellectual and people is to counter, rather than reinforce, differences in status 
and social position.   
 
Gramsci’s articulation of the need to develop good sense is linked to his concern 
for praxis, by which he meant something quite distinct from the commonly used 
formulation of action, reflection and action. Praxis implies more than the uniting 
of theory and practice in the sense of applying ideas and skills in ‘real life’ 
contexts such as those occuring in work placements. Marxism, for Gramsci, was 
the ‘philosophy of praxis’. Whilst this formulation was used as a code for Marxism 
as a way of deceiving prison censors, it also signalled the sense that praxis 
involves a principled and deeply held coherent set of ideas, values, vision and 
analytical understanding which shapes action (i.e. a philosophy).  Entwistle, for 
example, draws on this in relation to schooling and refers to praxis as a 
philosophy of teaching that involves a contextual understanding of the vocational 
role of the teacher and the attitudes and commitment appropriate for that role. 
Vocation as a way of living rather than a means of earning a living is a critical 
distinction. This seems to be very close to the position elaborated by Collins 
(1991) on adult education as vocation. Drawing on the sense of vocation as 
principled political and ethical commitment he argues that educators don’t put 
theory into practice but rather that they put themselves into practice. In this 
formulation the role of theory, analysis, study and scholarship is transformative 
because it changes the educator who then changes how they practice. 
Reworking Gramsci’s ideas in the HE setting would have a number of 
implications for lecturers in community education courses. It means addressing 
hegemony as a concept and as reality – although perhaps as a more complex 
and subtle phenomenon than the one put forward in Gramsci’s original 
conception.  
 
The idea that the autonomous aspects of civil society make it a potentially 
important site for challenging hegemony is important for those training to work in 
a wide range of public and voluntary organisations and agencies. The people in 
such communities, who are disadvantaged in multiple ways, are encapsulated in 
Gramsci’s conception of the ‘working class’ and are therefore potentially agents 
for challenging hegemony and for building a new social order. As Gramsci 
argues, formal and informal education can play an important role in helping such 
agents become ‘organic intellectuals’ better able to understand the world and to 
direct their own efforts in bringing about change. With regard to training 
community educators, the formal sphere of HE can equip students to work in the 
informal sphere in ways that support progressive change.  
 
A small example to illustrate the points just discussed is the first year course 
‘Community Education: Theory, Policy and Politics’ for undergraduate students. 
The purpose of this course is to introduce students to sustained ideological 
analysis and the political arguments that shape policy problems and solutions. 
Many of our first year students have grown up under the neo-liberalism of 
Thatcherism and the Third Way of New Labour and have little knowledge and 
experience of alternatives. Broadly speaking, they rarely have the intellectual 
resources for evaluating the ideological underpinnings of arguments about, for 
example, the slippery concept of community and how it is constructed 
ideologically. In a context where it is used liberally in policy this is a major 
disadvantage and can lead to community educators assuming that their role as 
agents of the state, and as resources for communities, is unproblematic.  
 
The pedagogy of the above course involves lectures on some of the major 
ideological perspectives (e.g. Conservatism, Liberalism etc) that are influential in 
policy terms as well as critical ideological perspectives on policy (e.g. Marxism, 
Environmentalism etc). Students are exposed to these perspectives in lectures 
and in smaller groups they are invited to ‘think inside’ the perspective and how 
policy problems and solutions are framed. Students are deliberately discouraged, 
initially, from being critical of the perspective until they understand it sufficiently. 
That is, they are asked to see how the ideas and values expressed in different 
ideological perspectives lead to different political arguments and policy stances 
which are developed over the length of the programme. After a series of seven 
weeks looking at different ideological perspectives the focus is turned around. 
For four more weeks specific policy areas are examined in terms of the 
ideological influences that have shaped them at different points of time. To 
assess how well students have grasped the material at the end of the course 
they have to write an assessment of a policy area covered during the course 
from at least two ideological perspectives. 
 
The above example is only a small one but illustrates the need for educational 
work that is essential for developing in community educators the resources and 
skills for developing a critical analysis of the politics of policy in communities. Of 
course, on its own, it may achieve very little but the aim is to highlight the need 
for an open and wide curriculum that is partisan without being ideologically rigid. 
It also embraces what is best in University life by exposing students to systematic 
bodies of knowledge which they are unlikely to have previously encountered but 
which they have to assimilate and digest before taking a position on. In 
developing awareness of ideological perspectives students are better equipped 
to understand how policy problems and solutions are formulated and where they 
stand, personally and politically, in relation to these as workers with a broad remit 
to serve the interests of communities.  
 
There is also a legitimate argument that some differentials are themselves 
rational, for example where expertise is present and where those who have it are 
accorded appropriate status. Lecturers in the featured programme are appointed 
on the basis of their experience and expertise. They select and train future 
practitioners and, in effect, act as the gateway to the profession. Through their 
work as educators they have the important function of mediating the accumulated 
practice knowledge that characterises and distinguishes the profession, whilst at 
the same time actively participating in the development of this knowledge through 
research and other activities. They make this knowledge and their expertise 
available and accessible to successive generations of students. As educators 
they support students in learning through engaging with and acquiring this 
knowledge. In doing so they ensure that it does not have to be constantly 
rediscovered. On this basis, it is right to recognise and respect the expertise of 
the lecturers in the featured programme. 
 
The preceding discussion refers mainly to the content of the curriculum, whereas 
attention to the process of teaching and learning is also required since, as we 
discussed above power is always already present in the classroom and can 
overwhelm and contradict content. This last point complements the one made by 
Collins about educators putting themselves into practice. In short, counter 
hegemonic educators must not be hegemonic – unless the problem with 
hegemony is simply that the ‘wrong’ ideas are valorised. Otherwise lecturers 
would be guilty of the sort of performative contradiction that we referred to earlier. 
This is important in terms of protecting the dialogue between intellectuals and 
people envisaged by Gramsci. The essential aspects of this dialogue need to be 
mirrored in the classroom otherwise students may acquire the idea of something 
without developing the capacity to make it a reality. This is where recourse back 
to discourse theory can be helpful. 
 
Lecturing and the interpretive function 
In line with the notion that learning is an act of reciprocity, consideration could be 
given to engaging students in systematic and open forms of enquiry and 
emphasising their right to say what they believe is relevant to the subject at hand. 
Importantly it would mean encouraging students to question those ideas and 
beliefs held by their lecturers. In Bauman’s (1987) terms lecturers are 
‘interpreters’ who help students develop positions and arguments rather than 
‘legislators’ who dictate what is worth knowing and prescribe how things have to 
be understood. Interpreters relinquish the superiority that legislators have by 
virtue of their privileged position, in that they themselves are drawn, at least 
potentially, into negotiations about the meaning and validity of utterances. By 
taking part in communicative action, they are accepting in principle the same 
status as those whose utterances they are trying to understand.  This could be 
further considered by thinking through what it might mean to establish a 
“commons” or “public sphere” in the programme (Brookfield, 2005).  
 
A public sphere would involve, as far as possible in this particular HE context, 
symmetrical obligations and entitlements between educators and students and 
students themselves. These would be important in countering the negative 
effects of “positionality” in an attempt to balance rational, affective and 
experiential modes of learning (Tisdell, 2001). In the first instance, educators 
need to provide appropriate training in the obligations and entitlements of 
discourse, such as turn taking in speech acts. It would mean involving students in 
debates with the intention of exposing weaknesses in arguments and 
propositions. Seminars or mini-conferences could be held featuring oppositional 
speakers.  Evocative methods such as film, drama, artwork, and creative writing, 
can also be used to access emotions and imagination.  
 
One example of teaching and learning that attempted to incorporate some of the 
elements just discussed can be seen in a course undertaken by work based, 
part-time students called: Community Education Work Based Learning 1: 
Professional Development.  The defining feature of this course was the focus on 
real and live problems or issues of interest to and relevance for the students. 
Relating to the specifics of their work situation, students had the opportunity to 
test developing ideas in real situations and, in turn, bring the results of action 
back into the learning process. As task groups were established and reported 
back to one another, the participants were involved in a collective learning 
process as part of a deliberative attempt to construct knowledge in new ways. 
The students shared and debated differing views within and between learning 
clusters and attempted to bring the ideas of the whole student group together. 
This final section required the students to synthesise their ideas as each task 
group had to represent the essence of their learning to the other groups. Here 
the purpose was to surface fundamental attitudes, views and beliefs that the 
students held about themselves as learners, and which influenced their 
engagement with the world, including approaches to work and education.  
 
In order to summarise and draw together the overlaps and connections between 
the positions of Habermas and Gramsci we have attempted to present these 
schematically in the following table. 
Table 1: Towards an educative space with instructive and discursive moments 
Gramsci 
 
Educative space Habermas 
 
Aim: Revolution  Aim: Democratic renewal 
The need to counter hegemonic 
and coercive power 
Education is strategic to 
countering oppression 
 
Approximating the ideal speech 
situation in teaching and learning 
processes settings could ground 
and promote societal 
democratization. 
The basic structure of language 
itself contains norms to criticize 
domination and oppression. 
Problem Solution: education for critique  Problem 
Hegemony is learned and 
protects sectional interests. It 
involves a process which can be 
undone – the learning has 
cognitive and affective 
dimensions.  
Lecturers can articulate, 
disseminate and make explicit, 
the culture, values and priorities 
of dominant or emerging social 
formations. 
 
Lecturers can exploit the 
possibilities for critique that are 
built into the very structure of 
language and communication. 
The steering effects of power and 
‘positionality’ lead to distorted 
communication and 
understanding. 
Resolution  Resolution 
The politics of common sense 
has to be interrogated before 
good sense can be obtained. 
Good sense – requires sustained 
argument and rational 
deliberation. New social relations 
between people need to be 
made. 
 
Testing validity claims through 
contestation, over time results in 
the development of reliable 
knowledge. 
Observance of the ‘rules’ of 
argumentation is necessary to 
allow the ‘unforced force of  the 
better argument’ to emerge. 
 
Educational task Role of the educator Educational task 
Lecturers have the authority and 
responsibility to transmit critical 
knowledge and provide 
opportunities for new ways of 
being. At the same time, they 
need to act as ‘interpreters’ 
helping students to develop 
positions and arguments.  
Not simply a process of 
handing down intellectual 
conclusions for people to “rubber 
stamp”, but instead 
involves an iterative process of 
identifying interests, the values 
which they generate, connecting 
ideas with experience, amending 
There is a need to suffuse 
learning and teaching 
environments with a 
commitment to communicative 
rationality. 
 and developing theory and values 
through new social practices 
 
Lecturers need to avoid a 
‘performative contradiction’ by 
opening up status to questioning, 
and modelling critical thinking 
and open forms of 
communication in the classroom 
setting. 
 
Conclusion 
This discussion introduced key concepts from Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action, and indicated the strength of the intellectual resources 
that this theory provides, particularly in relation to knowledge production through 
what we have termed a discursive pedagogy. This discourse theory is strong 
from a socio-cultural perspective regarding the nature of learning, and its main 
object of concern is the transformation of participation. The theory can be 
questioned, however, in terms of the extent to which it accounts for the influence 
of social and economic factors in positioning participants in communicative 
processes in ways that privilege some over others. Gramsci’s work is directly 
relevant to this issue, in particular his understanding of hegemony and the role of 
organic intellectuals in challenging common sense. In this kind of critical theory, 
transformative practice refers to a stance regarding the aims of teaching and 
learning, specifically the political, social, and economic empowerment of 
oppressed peoples. This redirects attention to legitimate concerns with the 
transmission of knowledge in the classroom. At the same time, Gramsci’s ideas 
about the nature of the educative exchange between intellectuals and people can 
themselves be usefully complemented by a Habermasian emphasis on the 
dialogical processes at the heart of this kind of exchange. In short, Gramsci’s 
understanding of hegemony could help educators to address the problem of 
positioning, while Habermas’s attempts to approximate the conditions for ‘ideal 
speech situations’ could enhance the educative relationship envisaged by 
Gramsci. In relation to the case of community education training, therefore, 
speaking Habermas to Gramsci and vice-versa could help lecturers better to 
develop collaborative approaches to knowledge production in ways that 
strengthen essentially democratic and socially purposeful ways of thinking and 
acting.  
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